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TO ALL PARTIES AND THEIR COUNSEL OF RECORD: 
 PLEASE TAKE NOTICE THAT on November 13, 2012, at 2:00 p.m., or as soon 
thereafter as this matter may be heard, Plaintiffs Nicole Pimental and Jessica Franklin will appear, 
through counsel, before the Honorable Yvonne Gonzales Rogers, or any judge sitting in her stead, 
at the United States District Court for the Northern District of California, Oakland Division, 
located at 1301 Clay Street, Oakland, California 94612, and then and there move the Court for an 
Order (i) granting preliminary approval of the Parties’ proposed class action settlement, (ii) 
certifying the proposed Settlement Class for settlement purposes only, (iii) approving the form and 
content of the notice to the members of the proposed Settlement Class, (iv) appointing Plaintiffs as 
Class Representatives, (v) appointing Plaintiffs’ counsel as Class Counsel, and (vi) scheduling a 
Fairness Hearing in this matter.  
 Plaintiffs’ motion is based upon this Notice, the Memorandum of Points and Authorities 
filed herewith, the exhibits attached thereto, and the record in this matter, along with any oral 
argument that may be presented to the Court and evidence submitted in connection therewith. 
Dated:  October 5, 2012  Respectfully submitted, 
 
NICOLE PIMENTAL and JESSICA FRANKLIN, 
individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated, 
 
By:  /s/  Rafey S. Balabanian     
   One of Plaintiffs’ Attorneys  
 
JAY EDELSON (Admitted Pro Hac Vice) 
(jedelson@edelson.com) 
RAFEY S. BALABANIAN (Admitted Pro Hac Vice) 
(rbalabanian@edelson.com) 
CHRISTOPHER L. DORE (Admitted Pro Hac Vice) 
(cdore@edelson.com)   
EDELSON MCGUIRE LLC 
350 North LaSalle Drive, Suite 1300 
Chicago, IL 60654 
Phone: 312.589.6370 
 
SEAN P. REIS (SBN 184044) 
(sreis@edelson.com) 
EDELSON MCGUIRE LLP 
30021 Tomas Street, Suite 300 
Rancho Santa Margarita, CA 92688 
Phone: 949.459.2124  
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APPROVAL OF CLASS ACTION SETTLEMENT 
I. INTRODUCTION  
Plaintiffs Nicole Pimental’s and Jessica Franklin’s claims in this putative class action arise 
out of Defendants Google Inc.’s and Slide, Inc.’s design and deployment of a group text 
messaging service—the so-called “Disco” service—that Plaintiffs contend resulted in hundreds of 
thousands of consumers receiving unauthorized and unwanted text message spam.  This conduct, 
Plaintiffs allege, violates the Telephone Consumer Protection Act, 47 U.S.C. § 227, et seq. 
(“TCPA”).  
After more than a year’s worth of litigation, which included briefing on several substantive 
motions, formal and informal discovery, several conferences of counsel and arm’s-length 
negotiations culminating in a private mediation presided over by a third-party neutral, the Parties 
have reached a proposed class action settlement that, if approved by the Court, will finally resolve 
all claims against Defendants related to their alleged violations of the TCPA. As explained below, 
the relief afforded under the settlement is a tremendous result for the proposed Settlement Class.1  
 Under the terms of the settlement, Defendants have agreed to create a cash Settlement 
Fund in the amount of $6,000,000 from which Settlement Class Members can make claims for a 
pro rata share of the Fund after payment of all Settlement Administration Expenses, incentive 
awards to the Class Representatives, and the Fee Award, if any, to Class Counsel.  Each 
Settlement Class Member’s pro rata share is anticipated to be, but can’t exceed, five hundred 
dollars ($500)—the full amount of the statutory penalty provided under the TCPA.  The Fund will 
also be used to pay all notice and claims administration expenses, attorneys’ fees and costs, and 
incentive awards to the Plaintiffs.  Also, of particular importance is the fact that there is no 
reversionary aspect to this settlement, meaning that if the full amount of the Fund is not exhausted, 
any remaining monies will go towards a cy pres distribution to independent not-for-profits agreed 
upon by the Parties, with the approval of the Court.  Finally, Defendants have shut down the Disco 
                                                
1 Unless otherwise stated herein, capitalized terms shall have the same meaning as set forth 
in the Parties’ Class Action Settlement Agreement, attached as Exhibit 1. 
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PLAINTIFFS’ MOTION FOR PRELIMINARY 2 CASE NO. 11-CV-02585-YGR 
APPROVAL OF CLASS ACTION SETTLEMENT 
service, so consumers will no longer be subjected to the unauthorized and unwanted text messages 
that gave rise to this suit. 
The fairness of this settlement can also be measured by comparing it to settlements reached 
in similar cases that received approval from federal courts across the country—most often in the 
Northern District of California—where individual payments to class members were less than the 
potentially $500 available here. See e.g. Kramer v. Autobytel, No. 10-cv-2722 (N.D. Cal. 2011) 
(finally approving settlement creating $12.2 million settlement fund from which class of 42 
million could claim up to $100 each); Satterfield v. Simon & Schuster, No. 06-cv-2893 (N.D. Cal. 
2010) (finally approving settlement creating $10 million settlement fund from which class of 
59,000 could claim up to $170 each); Lozano v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., No. 09-CV-
6344 (N.D. Ill. 2011) (finally approving settlement creating $16 million settlement fund from 
which class of 98,000 could claim up to $200 each); Kazemi v. Payless Shoesource, Inc., No. 
CV09-5142 (N.D. Cal. 2012) (finally approving settlement creating $6 million from which class 
of 8.5 million could claim a $25 merchandise certificate). 
All told, the settlement is an exceedingly fair result for the Class because, while Plaintiffs 
are confident in the strength of their claims, they recognize the uncertainty attendant with class 
action litigation of this sort, and especially given Defendants’ ability and willingness to continue 
their vigorous defense of this action.  As the results achieved by the settlement ultimately parallel, 
if not exceed, those reached in other settlements involving similar claims under the TCPA—
settlements that have received the approval of courts in this District and throughout the country—
this class action settlement should thus be viewed as well within the range of approval. 
Accordingly, Plaintiffs respectfully request that the Court grant the instant motion in its entirety.  
II. NATURE OF THE LITIGATION 
 A. Summary of the Litigation, Mediation & Settlement. 
In early 2011, Defendants Google and Slide jointly released a group text messaging service 
known as “Disco” that allowed users to simultaneously communicate via text message with large 
groups. (See Plaintiffs’ Consolidated Complaint (Dkt. 24), cited as “Compl.”, ¶¶ 11-13.) As 
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APPROVAL OF CLASS ACTION SETTLEMENT 
designed, the service was meant to allow groups of consumers to communicate with one another 
concurrently, instead of having to send a single text message multiple times. (Id. ¶¶ 11, 17.) Thus, 
using Disco, a single consumer could create a group, add the cell phone numbers of the persons 
they wanted to communicate with, and then send one single message that would reach each 
member of the group. (Id. ¶ 14.) However, there were serious problems with how the Disco groups 
were formed, wherein a “group creator” registered with Disco, names a group, and then enters the 
names and cellular telephone numbers of up to ninety-nine potential group members. (Id.) Group 
creation was based on an “opt in” procedure, meaning that members were automatically made part 
of a texting group simply by being added by the group creator, rather than being given the 
opportunity to affirmatively choose to take part in the group. (Id. ¶ 16.) Once a texting group was 
created, Defendants transmitted a text message containing promotional language and a link to 
download their mobile application (the “Disco Mobile App Text”). 
On September 14, 2011, Plaintiffs Pimental and Franklin filed their Consolidated 
Complaint alleging that they received unauthorized text message advertisements sent by or on 
behalf of Defendants, specifically the Disco Mobile App Text, in violation of the TCPA. (Dkt. 
24.)2 Defendants responded with a motion to dismiss on October 14, 2011, (1) arguing that  
Plaintiffs did not sufficiently allege that Defendants used an ATDS and therefore failed to state a 
claim for relief under the TCPA, and (2) construing the TCPA so as to argue that prohibition of 
the text messages at issue would violate Defendants’ First Amendment rights because the text 
messages were informational and “noncommercial” in nature. (Dkt. 29.) On March 2, 2012, the 
Court denied Defendants’ motion in its entirety. (Dkt. 59.) 
 While the Court considered the motion to dismiss, Plaintiffs served Defendants with their 
                                                
2  The case was originally filed with a different putative class representative, Brett Lusskin, 
and Ms. Pimental was substituted as the named plaintiff on June 24, 2011. Shortly thereafter, 
Plaintiff Jessica Franklin brought a class action suit for Defendants’ alleged violation of the TCPA 
based on the same conduct, and filed a Notice of Related Actions with her complaint. On 
September 22, 2011, the Court entered an order consolidating the related cases, appointing Interim 
Lead and Liaison Counsel, and authorizing the filing of Plaintiffs’ Consolidated Complaint. (Dkt. 
25.) 
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PLAINTIFFS’ MOTION FOR PRELIMINARY 4 CASE NO. 11-CV-02585-YGR 
APPROVAL OF CLASS ACTION SETTLEMENT 
first sets of written discovery requests. Defendants initially objected to the requests altogether and 
sought a stay of discovery from the Court. Following extended (some in-person) meet and confer 
conferences and the Court’s denial of the motion to dismiss, Defendants supplemented their 
discovery responses and produced several thousand pages of documents. Defendants later served 
their own written discovery requests, to which Plaintiffs responded.  
 At that same time, Defendants also filed a motion to stay the litigation based on a Petition 
for Expedited Declaratory Ruling and Clarification filed with the FCC by a defendant in a similar 
TCPA action. Defendants argued the litigation should be stayed under the doctrine of primary 
jurisdiction pending the FCC’s resolution of the issues concerning the TCPA’s “prior express 
consent” requirement and definition of an ATDS. While the Court ultimately denied that motion 
as well, it stated that “[i]f GroupMe’s petition for expedited ruling is acted upon, then the parties 
can bring it to the Court’s attention.” (Dkt. 70.)  The FCC has since issued a Public Notice seeking 
comment on GroupMe’s Petition. (Dkt. 73.) 
 From the outset of this case, the Parties discussed the possibility of resolution, but given 
that the litigation was contentious at the time, they could not reach a deal early on. Nevertheless, 
through their continued discussions and with the Court’s rulings as a backdrop, the Parties 
ultimately decided to give mediation a chance before they embarked on the long road of class 
certification briefing. (See Declaration of Rafey S. Balabanian ¶ 3, attached as Exhibit 2.) Thus, on 
July 30, 2012, they met in San Francisco for a formal mediation with John Bates, Esq. of JAMS. 
After caucusing with each side for an entire day, the Parties eventually reached an impasse and 
were prepared to end the mediation. (Id. ¶ 4.) To overcome that final impasse, however, Mr. Bates 
offered to make a mediator’s proposal, which both Parties agreed to consider and ultimately 
accepted. (Id.) The result was an agreement as to the principal terms of the settlement. (Id. ¶ 5.) 
Notwithstanding, it would take several more weeks of discussions to finalize the ancillary terms of 
the settlement and reduce it to writing in the form of the Parties’ Class Action Settlement 
Agreement now before the Court. (Id. ¶ 5.) Plaintiffs now seek preliminary approval of the 
settlement.  
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APPROVAL OF CLASS ACTION SETTLEMENT 
B. Defendants’ Position. 
At all times, Defendants have denied and continue to deny any wrongdoing whatsoever 
and have denied and continue to deny that they committed, or threatened or attempted to commit, 
any wrongful act or violation of law or duty alleged in the Action. Nonetheless, taking into 
account the uncertainty and risks inherent in any litigation, Defendants have concluded that it is 
desirable and beneficial to them that this Action be fully and finally settled and terminated in the 
manner and upon the terms and conditions set forth in the Settlement Agreement.  
III. TERMS OF THE SETTLEMENT 
 The terms of the settlement are fully set forth in the Settlement Agreement attached hereto 
as Exhibit 1 and summarized as follows: 
A. Class Definition.  
The Settlement Agreement provides for a Settlement Class defined as follows: 
 
All Persons who received the Disco Mobile App Text or other text messages sent 
by or through the Disco Messaging Service informing such Persons about the 
Disco Messaging Service.  
 
(Ex. 1, § 1.4) 
B. Class Member Payments. 
  Defendants have agreed to create a cash Settlement Fund of $6,000,000 from which Class 
Members can make claims for a pro rata share of the Fund after payment of all Settlement 
Administration Expenses, incentive awards to the Class Representatives, and the Fee Award, if 
any, to Class Counsel.  Each Settlement Class Member’s pro rata share is anticipated to be, but 
can’t exceed, five hundred dollars ($500)—the full amount of statutory penalty provided under the 
TCPA. It is also noteworthy that Defendants have since terminated the service, and thus, 
consumers will no longer be subjected to the offending text messages. 
C. Cy Pres Distribution. 
In the event that there are any monies remaining in the Settlement Fund after payment of 
all valid claims, Settlement Administration Expenses, the Fee Award and Plaintiffs’ incentive 
awards, then such funds shall be paid to one or more not-for-profit organizations jointly nominated 
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by the Parties using the following criteria, and approved by the Court: 
 
(a) there must be no affiliation between the proposed recipient and any of the 
Parties or their Counsel, including Supporting Counsel; and 
 
(b) the recipient must use the money to promote the interests of the absent class 
members. 
(Ex 1, § 2.4.) The Parties will post the proposed recipients on the Settlement Website no later than 
fourteen days prior to the Objection Deadline.  
D. Additional Relief. 
In addition to the individual relief discussed above, Defendants have agreed to the 
following relief:   
1. Payment of Notice and Administrative Fees: All Settlement 
Administration Expenses will be paid out of the Settlement Fund. (Ex. 1, § 1.43.) 
2. Compensation for the Class Representatives: In addition to any award 
under the Settlement, and in recognition of their efforts on behalf of the Settlement Class, 
Defendants have agreed to pay from the Settlement Fund, subject to approval of the Court, an 
incentive award of $5,000 to each of the Class Representatives. (Ex. 1, § 8.4.) 
3. Payment of Attorneys’ Fees and Expenses: Under the Settlement 
Agreement, Defendants have agreed not to oppose Class Counsel’s requested Fee Award, subject 
to Court approval, of up to 1/3 of the Settlement Fund, inclusive of both attorneys’ fees and costs. 
(Ex. 1, § 8.1.) 
 E. Release. 
In exchange for the relief provided above, and upon the entry of a final order approving the 
settlement, Defendants and each of their related affiliates and entities will be released from any 
claims, whether known or unknown, arising out of Defendants Google’s and Slide’s acts or 
omissions related to the alleged sending of the Disco Mobile App Text through the Disco 
Messaging Service, or a substantially similar text from Defendants that advertised Disco’s mobile 
applications. (Ex. 1, §§ 1.32-1.34, 3.1-3.2.)   
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PLAINTIFFS’ MOTION FOR PRELIMINARY 7 CASE NO. 11-CV-02585-YGR 
APPROVAL OF CLASS ACTION SETTLEMENT 
IV. THE PROPOSED SETTLEMENT CLASS SHOULD BE CERTIFIED 
 Before granting preliminary approval of a settlement, the Court should determine that the 
proposed settlement class is proper for certification for settlement purposes. MANUAL FOR 
COMPLEX LITIGATION § 21.632 (4th ed. 2004); Amchem Prods. Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 620 
(1997). Certification of a class is proper when the plaintiff demonstrates that the proposed class 
and proposed class representative meet the following prerequisites of Rule 23(a): numerosity, 
commonality, typicality, and adequacy of representation. Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(1-4).   
In addition to meeting the requirements of Rule 23(a), a plaintiff seeking class certification 
must also satisfy at least one of the three provisions of Rule 23(b). Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b); Stearns v. 
Ticketmaster Corp., 655 F.3d 1013, 1019 (9th Cir. 2011). Where, as here, a plaintiff seeks 
certification under Rule 23(b)(3), he or she must demonstrate that common questions of law or 
fact predominate over individual issues and that maintaining the suit as a class action is superior to 
other methods of adjudication. Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3); Amchem, 521 U.S. at 615-16; Stearns, 655 
F.3d at 1019. In making the determination, the Court should accept the allegations of a plaintiff’s 
complaint as true, but may consider matters beyond the pleadings to determine if the claims are 
suitable for resolution on a class-wide basis. Celano v. Marriot Int’l, Inc., 242 F.R.D. 544, 548 
(N.D. Cal. 2007). In this case, the proposed Settlement Class meets each of the requirements for 
certification under Rule 23(a) and satisfies the requirements of Rule 23(b)(3) as well. 
A. The Numerosity Requirement is Satisfied. 
 The first prerequisite to class certification is numerosity, which requires that “the class [be] 
so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(1). No specific 
number is needed to satisfy this requirement, nor is the plaintiff required to state the “exact” 
number of potential class members. Celano, 242 F.R.D. at 548. Generally, the numerosity 
requirement is satisfied when a class is comprised of 40 or more members. See Moshogiannis v. 
Sec. Consultants Group, Inc., No. 5:10-CV-05971 EJD, 2012 WL 423860, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 8, 
2012) (holding that numerosity is satisfied by class of 254 members); see also Hopkins v. Stryker 
Sales Corp., No. 5:11-CV-02786-LHK, 2012 WL 1715091, at *4 n.9 (N.D. Cal. May 14, 2012) 
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(numerosity satisfied by class of 130); Algee v. Nordstrom, Inc., No. C 11-301 CW MEJ, 2012 
WL 1575314, at *2 (N.D. Cal. May 3, 2012) (holding that a class of 60 individuals is sufficient). 
Here, discovery has shown that over 400,000 SMS text messages were sent containing 
language similar to the Disco Mobile App Text to approximately the same number of consumers. 
(Balabanian Decl. ¶ 9.) Accordingly, the proposed Settlement Class is so numerous that joinder of 
their claims is impracticable and the numerosity requirement is satisfied. See CONTE & NEWBERG, 
4 NEWBERG ON CLASS ACTIONS § 3:5, 243-46 (4th ed. 2002) (“Class actions under the amended 
Rule 23 have frequently involved classes numbering in the hundreds, or thousands. In such cases, 
the impracticability of bringing all class members before the court has been obvious, and the Rule 
23(a)(1) requirement has been easily met.”).  
 B. The Commonality Requirement is Satisfied. 
 The second threshold to certification requires that “there are questions of law or fact 
common to the class.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(2). Commonality may be demonstrated when the 
claims of all class members “depend upon a common contention” and “even a single common 
question will do.” Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541, 2560 (2011); see also Hanlon 
v. Chrysler Corp., 150 F.3d 1011, 1019 (9th Cir. 1998) (“[t]he existence of shared legal issues 
with divergent factual predicates is sufficient, as is a common core of salient facts coupled with 
disparate legal remedies within the class.”). The common contention must be of such a nature that 
it is capable of class-wide resolution and that the “determination of its truth or falsity will resolve 
an issue that is central to the validity of each one of the claims in one stroke.” Wal-Mart, 131 S. 
Ct. at 2560. Moreover, the permissive standard of commonality provides that “[w]here the 
circumstances of each particular class member vary but retain a common core of factual or legal 
issues with the rest of the class, commonality exists.” Parra v. Bashas’ Inc., 536 F.3d 975, 978-79 
(9th Cir. 2008). 
In the instant case, all members of the Settlement Class share a common statutory claim 
under the TCPA that arose out of the Defendants’ standardized conduct – the transmission of the 
Disco Mobile App Text to Settlement Class Members’ cellular phones through the Disco 
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messaging service. The entirety of the Settlement Class’s claims can be resolved by determining 
(a) whether Defendants sent the Disco Mobile App Text messages, (b) whether Defendants 
received and maintained proof of prior express consent to transmit text messages to the Settlement 
Class, (c) whether the equipment used to send the offending text messages was an ATDS as 
defined by the TCPA, (d) whether Defendants did so knowingly and willfully, and (e) whether 
Plaintiffs and the Settlement Class Members are entitled to statutory relief as a result of that 
conduct. Answering these questions “in one stroke” would effectuate “class wide resolution.” 
Wal-Mart, 131 S. Ct. at 2560. Thus, Plaintiffs have satisfied the commonality requirement. 
Indeed, several courts have found that the commonality requirement is easily satisfied in TCPA 
cases where, as here, the same unauthorized communication is transmitted by defendants to a list 
of consumer phone numbers. See Kavu, Inc. v. Omnipak Corp., 246 F.R.D. 642, 647 (W.D. Wash. 
2007); G.M Sign, Inc. v. Group C Commc’ns, Inc., 2010 WL 744262, at *5 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 25, 
2010); Paldo Sign & Display Co. v. Topsail Sportswear, Inc., No. 08 C 5959, 2010 WL 4931001, 
at *2 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 29, 2010). 
Accordingly, Rule 23(a)’s commonality requirement is satisfied as well.  
C. The Typicality Requirement is Satisfied. 
 Rule 23 next requires that the representative plaintiff’s claims be typical of those of the 
putative class he or she seeks to represent. Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(3). The typicality requirement 
ensures that “the interest of the named representative aligns with the interests of the class.” Wolin 
v. Jaguar Land Rover N. Am. LLC, 617 F.3d 1168, 1175 (9th Cir. 2010). Typicality is measured 
under a permissive standard and does not require that the representative’s claims be substantially 
identical, only that they are “reasonably coextensive with [the claims] of absent class members.” 
Hanlon, 150 F.3d at 1020.  
In the instant action, Plaintiffs Pimental’s and Franklin’s claims are identical to those of 
the proposed Settlement Class. Plaintiffs have both pleaded that they received the Disco Mobile 
App Text from Defendants, without prior express consent, and were damaged as a result—
qualifying them both as members of the Class. (Compl. ¶¶ 25-37.) As such, Plaintiffs’ claims for 
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relief under the TCPA are typical of (and, in reality, identical to) those of the proposed Class, and 
23(a)(3)’s requirement for typicality is easily met. See e.g. Holtzman v. Turza, No. 08 C 2014, 
2009 WL 3334909, *5 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 14, 2009) (finding typicality met where plaintiff’s number 
appeared on a fax log and where defendant’s identical conduct resulted in each class member’s 
claim.); Clearbrook v. Rooflifters, LLC, No. 08 C 3276, 2010 WL 2635781, at *3 (N.D. Ill. June 
28, 2010) (“The organized fashion of obtaining thousands of [cell phone] numbers through one 
third-party source makes the issue of consent typical to all the class members”).   
D. The Adequate Representation Requirement is Satisfied. 
 The final Rule 23(a) prerequisite requires that proposed class representatives have and will 
continue to “fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(4). To 
determine if representation is adequate, the Court must ask “(1) do the named plaintiffs and their 
counsel have any conflicts of interest with other class members and (2) will the named plaintiffs 
and their counsel prosecute the action vigorously on behalf of the class?” Hanlon, 150 F.3d at 
1020. 
In this case, Plaintiffs have the same interests as the other members of the proposed 
Settlement Class—they and each Settlement Class Member received unauthorized promotional 
text messages sent by or on behalf of Defendants, entitling them to statutory damages under the 
TCPA. Thus, they each have an interest in recovering the statutory damages to which they are 
entitled and in obtaining the prospective relief necessary to ensure that Defendants’ alleged 
misconduct does not continue into the future. Furthermore, Plaintiffs have no interests antagonistic 
to those of the proposed Settlement Class. (Balabanian Decl. ¶ 11.) As such, Plaintiffs will fairly 
and adequately protect the interests of the Settlement Class and their pursuit of this case 
demonstrates as much. 
Further, proposed Class Counsel and the lawyers at Edelson McGuire are well-respected 
members of the legal community who have extensive experience in class actions of similar size, 
scope, and complexity to the instant action. (Id. ¶ 10.) They have regularly engaged in major 
complex litigation involving mobile technologies, have the resources necessary to conduct 
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litigation of this nature, and have frequently been appointed lead class counsel by courts 
throughout the country. (See Firm Resume of Edelson McGuire LLC, attached to the Balabanian 
Declaration as Exhibit A); In re Netflix Privacy Litigation, 11-cv-00379-EJD (Dkt. 59) (N.D. Cal. 
2011) (appointed Interim Class Counsel in adversarial leadership dispute, during which Judge 
Davila noted that Edelson McGuire “specializes in class actions relating to consumer technology 
and privacy issues” and that the “firm’s significant and particularly specialized expertise in 
electronic privacy litigation and class actions, renders them superior to represent the putative 
class.”); In re JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. Home Equity Line of Credit Litig., No. 10-cv-3647, 
MDL 2167 (Dkt. 37) (N.D. Ill. 2010) (appointed Interim Co-Lead Class Counsel in multidistrict 
litigation involving Chase’s HELOC suspensions based on purported declines in borrower home 
values); In re Facebook Privacy Litig., (10-cv-02389-JW) (Dkt. No. 69) (N.D. Cal. Dec. 10, 2010) 
(Judge Ware, in appointing co-lead counsel, noted that Edelson McGuire’s lawyers “were pioneers 
in the electronic privacy class action field, having litigated some of the largest consumer class 
actions in the country on this issue”).  
Most importantly, proposed Class Counsel are among the leading attorneys in the nation 
with respect to prosecuting class actions related to the alleged dissemination of unauthorized text 
messages in violation of the TCPA. See Satterfield, No. 06-cv-2893 CW (N.D. Cal. 2010)  
(appointed Class Counsel in nationwide class action settlement of TCPA claims), Kramer, No. 10-
cv-2722 (N.D. Cal. 2011) (same); Lozano, No. 09-CV-6344 (N.D. Ill. 2011) (same). As they did 
in each of those cases, to date, proposed Class Counsel have diligently investigated, prosecuted, 
and dedicated substantial resources to the claims in this Action, and they will continue to do so 
throughout its pendency. (Balabanian Decl. ¶ 8.)  
Accordingly, Plaintiffs and their counsel have and will continue to adequately represent the 
Settlement Class and the final Rule 23(a) requirement is satisfied. 
 E. The Proposed Settlement Class Meets the Requirements of Rule 23(b)(3). 
 Once Rule 23(a)’s prerequisites have been met, Plaintiffs must also demonstrate that the 
proposed Settlement Class satisfies one of the three subsections of Rule 23(b). Zinser v. Accufix 
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Research Inst., Inc., 253 F.3d 1180, 1186 (9th Cir. 2001). Here, Plaintiffs seek certification under 
Rule 23(b)(3), which provides that a class action may be maintained where: (1) the questions of 
law and fact common to members of the class predominate over any questions affecting only 
individuals, and (2) the class action mechanism is superior to the other available methods for the 
fair and efficient adjudication of the controversy. Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3); Pierce v. County of 
Orange, 526 F.3d 1190, 1197 n.5 (9th Cir. 2008). Certification under Rule 23(b)(3) is appropriate 
and encouraged “whenever the actual interests of the parties can be served best by settling their 
differences in a single action.” Hanlon, 150 F.3d at 1022. 
  1. Common Questions of Law and Fact Predominate. 
The focus of the predominance requirement is whether the proposed class is sufficiently 
cohesive to warrant adjudication by representation. Amchem, 521 U.S. at 623. Predominance 
exists “[w]hen common questions present a significant aspect of the case and they can be resolved 
for all members of the class in a single adjudication.” Hanlon, 150 F.3d at 1022. Common legal 
and factual issues have been found to predominate where the class members’ claims arose under 
the TCPA, Grannan v. Alliant Law Group, P.C., No. C10-02803 HRL, 2012 WL 216522, at *5 
(N.D. Cal. Jan. 24, 2012), and where the TCPA claims focused on the defendant’s advertising 
practices. CE Design v. Beaty Constr. Inc., No. 07 C 3340, 2009 WL 192481, at *8-9 (N.D. Ill. 
Jan. 26, 2009). 
In this case, the common questions are at the heart of this litigation. The Settlement Class 
Members’ claims—as well as those of Plaintiffs Pimental and Franklin—all arise from 
Defendants’ standardized conduct of sending unauthorized text messages promoting their Disco 
messaging service. Thus, the core factual and legal issues are the same (i.e., predominate) for each 
Settlement Class Member. That is, in order to prove their claims, each Class Member need only 
show that (i) the Disco Mobile App Text message promoting Defendants’ Disco messaging 
service was transmitted by and on behalf of Defendants, (ii) the system used to transmit the 
messages was an ATDS, and (iii) Defendants did not obtain the requisite “prior express consent” 
to send the messages. Thus, their claims will be subject to common proofs applicable to the 
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Settlement Class as a whole, and the common questions resulting from Defendants’ alleged 
misconduct predominate over any issues affecting only individual members of the Settlement 
Class, such as the amount of damages each Class Member is entitled to recover. See, e.g., 
Yokoyama v. Midland Nat. Life Ins. Co., 594 F.3d 1087, 1094 (9th Cir. 2010) (holding that “[in] 
this circuit … damage calculations alone cannot defeat certification”).  
 2.  This Class Action is the Superior Method of Adjudication. 
Finally, certification of this lawsuit as a class action is superior to other methods available 
to fairly, adequately, and efficiently resolve the claims of the proposed Settlement Class. To meet 
the superiority requirement, a plaintiff must show that a class action is the “most efficient and 
effective means of resolving the controversy.” Wolin, 617 F.3d at 1175-76.  
Absent class treatment here, each Settlement Class Member will be required to present the 
same or essentially the same legal and factual arguments, in separate and duplicative proceedings, 
the result of which would be a multiplicity of trials conducted at enormous expense to both the 
judiciary and the litigants. Moreover, there is no indication that members of the Settlement Class 
have an interest in individual litigation or an incentive to pursue their claims individually, given 
the small amount of damages likely to be recovered relative to the resources required to prosecute 
such an action. See Chavez v. Blue Sky Natural Beverage Co., 268 F.R.D. 365, 379 (N.D. Cal. 
2010) (holding that a class action is superior to maintaining individual claims for a small amount 
of damages). Additionally, the proposed settlement will give the Parties the benefit of finality, and 
because this action has now been settled, pending approval of the Court, the Court need not be 
concerned with issues of manageability relating to trial. See Amchem, 521 U.S. at 620 
(“[c]onfronted with a request for settlement-only class certification, a district court need not 
inquire whether the case…would present intractable management problems….”). Thus, the 
superiority requirement is also met. 
Finally, the propriety of class certification finds further support in the fact that numerous 
courts in this District and nationwide have certified settlement classes based on similar facts. See 
Satterfield, No. 06-cv-2893 CW (N.D. Cal. 2010), Kramer, No. 10-cv-2722 (N.D. Cal. 2011); 
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Lozano, No. 09-CV-6344 (N.D. Ill. 2011).  As in those cases, Plaintiffs here have satisfied each of 
the requirements for class certification under Rules 23(a) and (b)(3).  The Court should therefore 
certify the proposed Settlement Class for settlement purposes. 
 
V. THE COURT SHOULD APPOINT PLAINTIFFS’ COUNSEL AS CLASS 
COUNSEL 
 Under Rule 23, “a court that certifies a class must appoint class counsel . . . [who] must 
fairly and adequately represent the interests of the class.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(g)(1)(B). In making 
this determination, the Court must consider counsel’s (1) work in identifying or investigating 
potential claims, (2) experience in handling class actions or other complex litigation, and the types 
of claims asserted in the case, (3) knowledge of the applicable law, and (4) resources committed to 
representing the class. Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(g)(1)(A)(i-iv).  
 As discussed above, proposed Class Counsel have extensive experience prosecuting 
similar class actions and other complex litigation. (Balabanian Decl. ¶ 10.) Further, proposed 
Class Counsel have diligently investigated and prosecuted the claims in this matter, have 
dedicated substantial resources to the investigation of those claims, and have successfully 
negotiated the settlement of this matter to the benefit of the proposed Settlement Class. (Id.) 
Accordingly, the Court should appoint Jay Edelson, Rafey S. Balabanian, and Christopher L. Dore 
of Edelson McGuire LLC as Class Counsel. 
 
VI. THE PROPOSED SETTLEMENT IS FUNDAMENTALLY FAIR, REASONABLE, 
AND ADEQUATE, AND THUS WARRANTS PRELIMINARY APPROVAL 
After certifying the proposed Class for the purposes of settlement, the Court must next 
consider whether to grant preliminary approval of the settlement. The procedure for review of a 
proposed class action settlement is a well-established two-step process. Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(e); see 
also CONTE & NEWBERG, 4 NEWBERG ON CLASS ACTIONS, §11.25, at 3839 (4th ed. 2002). The 
first step is a preliminary, pre-notification hearing to determine whether the proposed settlement is 
“within the range of possible approval.” NEWBERG, §11.25, at 3839 (quoting MANUAL FOR 
COMPLEX LITIGATION §30.41 (3d ed. 1995)); In re Syncor ERISA Litig., 516 F.3d 1095, 1110 (9th 
Cir. 2008); In re Tableware Antitrust Litig., 484 F. Supp. 2d 1078, 1079 (N.D. Cal. 2007). This 
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hearing is not a fairness hearing; its purpose, rather, is to ascertain whether there is any reason to 
notify the putative Class members of the proposed settlement and to proceed with a fairness 
hearing. In re Tableware Antitrust Litig., 484 F. Supp. 2d at 1079. Notice of a settlement should be 
sent where “the proposed settlement appears to be the product of serious, informed, non-collusive 
negotiations, has no obvious deficiencies, does not improperly grant preferential treatment to class 
representatives or segments of the class, and falls within the range of possible approval.” Id. 
The Manual for Complex Litigation characterizes the preliminary approval stage as an 
“initial evaluation” of the fairness of the proposed settlement made by a court on the basis of 
written submissions and informal presentation from the settling parties. MANUAL FOR COMPLEX 
LITIGATION § 21.632. Ultimately, the court’s role is to ensure that the settlement is fundamentally 
fair, reasonable, and adequate. Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(e)(2); In re Syncor, 516 F.3d at 1100. If the 
Court finds a settlement proposal “within the range of possible approval,” it then proceeds to the 
second step in the review process—the final approval hearing. NEWBERG, §11.25, at 3839.  
A strong judicial policy exists in favor of the voluntary conciliation and settlement of 
complex class action litigation. In re Syncor, 516 F.3d at 1101 (citing Officers for Justice v. Civil 
Serv. Comm’n, 688 F.2d 615 (9th Cir. 1982)). While the district court has discretion regarding the 
approval of a proposed settlement, it should give “proper deference to the private consensual 
decision of the parties.” Hanlon, 150 F.3d at 1027. In fact, when a settlement is negotiated at 
arm’s length by experienced counsel, there is a presumption that it is fair and reasonable. In re 
Pac. Enterprises Sec. Litig., 47 F.3d 373, 378 (9th Cir. 1995) (“Parties represented by competent 
counsel are better positioned than courts to produce a settlement that fairly reflects each party's 
expected outcome in litigation.”). A settlement negotiated with the assistance of an experienced 
private mediator is further proof that that the settlement was reached fairly and provides adequate 
relief. Thieriot v. Celtic Ins. Co., No. C-10-04462-LB, 2011 WL 1522385, *5 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 21, 
2011) (“[T]he settlement is the product of serious, non-collusive, arms’ length negotiations by 
experienced counsel with the assistance of an experienced mediator at JAMS . . . In sum, the court 
finds that viewed as a whole, the settlement is sufficiently “fair, adequate, and reasonable” such 
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that approval of the settlement is warranted.”). 
There should be no doubt that the proposed settlement here is “within the range of possible 
approval.” As an initial matter, the process used to reach the settlement was fair. That is, despite 
their many discussions regarding potential resolution, the Parties were only able to reach a 
settlement with the assistance of mediator John Bates. (Balabanian Decl. ¶ 4.) Likewise, they 
agreed on the terms of the settlement through experienced counsel, who ensured they had the 
information necessary to evaluate the terms of any proposed agreement and to reach a fair and 
reasonable compromise. (Id. ¶ 6.) Indeed, prior to the mediation and in addition to their own 
investigation, proposed Class Counsel reviewed thousands of pages of documents produced by 
Defendants in discovery. That information shed further light on the contours of the proposed Class 
and Defendants’ transmission of the text messages at issues, and, ultimately, informed the terms of 
the settlement now before the Court. (Id.) 
The fairness, reasonableness, and adequacy of the substantive terms of the settlement are 
also readily apparent. Specifically, each Settlement Class Member stands to recover a pro rata 
share of the Settlement Fund (not to exceed $500)—the full amount of statutory damages to which 
they are entitled under the TCPA. In other words, the settlement provides Class Members the full 
amount of relief they could hope to obtain, even if successful at trial. The Court need not take 
Plaintiffs’ word for it though; as shown in the chart below courts throughout the country—most 
often in the Northern District of California—have approved class action settlements reached in 
similar cases alleging violations of the TCPA, even where individual payments to class members 
were less than the potentially $500 available here. 
Case Name Class Size Per Class 
Member 
Payment 
Total Settlement Fund 
Weinstein v. The Timberland 
Co., et al. (N.D. Ill. 2008) 
40,000 $150  $7 million  
Satterfield v. Simon & 
Schuster (N.D. Cal. 2010) 
59,000 $175 $10 million 
Lozano v. Twentieth Century 
Fox (N.D. Ill. 2011) 
98,000 $200 $16 million 
Kramer v. Autobytel (N.D. 
Cal. 2011) 
42,000,000 $100 $12.2 million 
Gutierrez, et al. v. Barclays 
Group, et al. (S.D. Cal. 2012) 
66,000 $100 $8.2 million 
Kazemi v. Payless Shoesource 
(N.D. Cal. 2012) 
8,500,000 $25 merchandise 
certificate 
$6 million  
(in merchandise certificates) 
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The present settlement exceeds the individual recovery made available to each class 
member in the settlements listed above, and it has the added benefit of a full payout, meaning that 
no part of the Fund will revert to the Defendants.  Specifically, if after payment of all valid claims, 
notice and claims administration expenses, attorneys’ fees, and the incentive awards to the 
Plaintiffs, the entire Settlement Fund is not exhausted, any remaining monies will go toward a cy 
pres distribution to one or more independent not-for-profits agreed upon by the Parties, with the 
approval of the Court. 
A cy pres distribution is a reasonable and widely accepted settlement vehicle for unclaimed 
funds. See Lane v. Facebook, Inc., No. 10-16380, 2012 WL 4125857, at *4 (9th Cir. Sept. 20, 
2012) (“A cy pres remedy . . . is a settlement structure wherein class members receive an indirect 
benefit (usually through defendant donations to a third party) rather than a direct monetary 
payment.”). As is the case here, distributing unclaimed funds to a cy pres recipient, rather than 
having them revert back to the defendant, “allows a court to distribute unclaimed or non-
distributable portions of a class action settlement fund to the ‘next best’ class of beneficiaries.” 
Nachshin v. AOL, LLC, 663 F.3d 1034, 1036 (9th Cir. 2011).  
The Ninth Circuit recently proclaimed that to warrant approval, the cy pres remedy must 
“account for the nature of the plaintiffs’ lawsuit, the objectives of the underlying statutes, and the 
interests of the silent class members.” Nachshin, 663 F.3d at 1036. In the present case, and in 
accordance with federal law, the Settlement Agreement requires that any cy pres distribution 
account for the nature of the Plaintiffs’ lawsuit, the objectives of the underlying statutes, and the 
interests of the silent class members. The Parties have agreed to present the proposed cy pres 
recipients to the Court for approval, as well as post the proposed recipients on the Settlement 
Website prior to the objection deadline to allow putative Class Members an opportunity to weigh 
in on a potential distribution.   
Given the meaningful relief afforded under the settlement, and notwithstanding Plaintiffs’ 
belief in the strength of their claims, the expense, duration, and complexity of protracted litigation 
must be given due consideration.  Similarly, in light of the complexity of the issues and the 
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amount in controversy, the defeated party would likely appeal, which would further delay any 
recovery by the Settlement Class. (Id.)  And, there is even potential for proceedings in other 
forums like the FCC, which could, in theory, bring this case to a halt. 
For all of these reasons, Plaintiffs and proposed Class Counsel strongly believe that the 
monetary and prospective relief provided by the settlement weighs heavily in favor of a finding 
that it is fair, reasonable and adequate and within the range of approval. Accordingly, the Court 
may grant preliminary approval of the settlement. 
VII. CLASS COUNSEL’S FEE REQUEST AND PLAINTIFFS’ INCENTIVE AWARDS 
The Parties’ Settlement Agreement sets forth that Plaintiffs’ counsel will seek, and 
Defendants will not oppose, up to one third of the Settlement Fund ($2,000,000) in attorneys’ fees 
and reimbursement of costs, and Plaintiffs’ collective incentive award of five thousand dollars 
($5,000). For the sake of clarity, those are the maximum amounts for which the Parties agreed 
Class Counsel could petition the Court for an award of attorneys’ fees and incentive awards.  
While proposed Class Counsel does intend to seek those amounts in attorneys’ fees and incentive 
awards, the information is being presented at this juncture only to fully apprise the Court of the 
full terms of the settlement.  Thus, the Court need not make a determination as to the 
reasonableness of the proposed request at this time.    
Instead, in accordance with the Ninth Circuit’s ruling in In Re Mercury Interactive Corp. 
Sec. Litig., 618 F.3d 988 (9th Cir. 2009), Plaintiffs’ counsel will move the Court one week prior to 
the objection deadline for approval of their fee request and Plaintiffs’ incentive award and will 
post their request—and the justification for it—to the settlement website. In so doing, Plaintiffs’ 
counsel will present fulsome arguments in support of their fee petition and request for incentive 
awards and, in line with Ninth Circuit precedent when demonstrating the reasonableness of the 
requested fees, will conduct both a percentage of the benefit analysis and a lodestar cross-check. 
VIII. THE PROPOSED PLAN OF CLASS NOTICE 
 Finally, Rule 23(b)(3) requires that in cases such as this, where the relief sought includes 
monetary damages and class certification is requested, notice must be disseminated to the 
Case4:11-cv-02585-YGR   Document84   Filed10/05/12   Page23 of 27
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
 
 
 
PLAINTIFFS’ MOTION FOR PRELIMINARY 19 CASE NO. 11-CV-02585-YGR 
APPROVAL OF CLASS ACTION SETTLEMENT 
proposed class. To satisfy the requirements of both Rule 23 and Due Process, Rule 23(c)(2)(B) 
provides that “[f]or any class certified under Rule 23(b)(3), the court must direct to class members 
the best notice practicable under the circumstances, including individual notice to all members 
who can be identified through reasonable effort.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(2)(B); Eisen v. Carlisle & 
Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156, 173 (1974). Rule 23(e)(1) similarly requires that, “[t]he court must direct 
notice in a reasonable manner to all class members who would be bound by a proposed settlement, 
voluntary dismissal, or compromise.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(e)(1). Notice is “adequate if it may be 
understood by the average class member.” NEWBERG, § 11:53 at 167. The substance of the notice 
to the settlement class must describe the nature of the action, the definition of the class to be 
certified, the class claims and defenses at issue, as well as explain that settlement class members 
may enter an appearance through counsel if so desired, request to be excluded from the settlement 
class, and that the effect of a class judgment shall be binding on all class members. See Fed. R. 
Civ. P. 23 (c)(2)(B). 
The Parties’ settlement contemplates a three-part Notice Plan, which satisfies both the 
substance and manner of distribution requirements of Rule 23 and Due Process. In the first step, 
Settlement Administrator Epiq Systems will use the cellular phone numbers of Settlement Class 
Members—found in Defendants’ records—for a reverse look-up process to identify each 
Settlement Class Member’s mailing address. Once the addresses have been compiled, direct notice 
via post-card—substantially in the form attached as Exhibit D to the Settlement Agreement—will 
be disseminated to each Class Member. (Ex. 1, § 4.2(c).) 
 Secondly, the Settlement Administrator will oversee wide-ranging publication notice, 
which requires the placement of half-page versions of the notice, attached as Exhibit C to the 
Settlement Agreement, in the national publications, People Magazine and National Geographic. 
(Ex. 1, § 4.2(d)). Additionally, online media announcements, attached as Exhibit E to the 
Settlement Agreement, will be published on the Internet and notice via press release will be 
provided to local, national and syndicated news organizations. (Ex. 1, § 4.2(e)). 
 Finally, the Settlement Administrator will establish a website, which will provide the 
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traditional “long form” notice (attached as Exhibit B to the Settlement Agreement), allow 
uninterrupted access by the public to relevant Court documents, access to a downloadable claim 
form, include information on how to opt out or object to the settlement, as well as provide for the 
online submission of claims. (Ex. 1, § 4.2(g)). 
 All of the notices are neutral in tone and will provide Settlement Class Members with a 
detailed, but easy to understand, explanation of their options, allowing them to make an informed 
decision as to their participation or non-participation in the settlement. The combination of direct 
notice, publication notice, online advertisements, the settlement website, and a press release 
represent a wide cross-section of media specifically chosen to target likely Settlement Class 
Members and attain the widest reach possible. (Copies of the proposed notices and Claim Form 
are attached as Exhibits A-E to the Settlement Agreement.) As such, the proposed Notice Plan 
comports with Rule 23 and the requirements of due process and should be approved by the Court.3  
IX. CONCLUSION 
 For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiffs Nicole Pimental and Jessica Franklin respectfully 
request that the Court enter an Order (i) granting preliminary approval of the Parties’ proposed 
class action settlement, (ii) certifying the proposed Settlement Class for settlement purposes only, 
(iii) approving the form and content of the notice to the members of the Settlement Class, (iv) 
appointing Plaintiffs as Class Representatives, (v) appointing Plaintiffs’ counsel as Class Counsel, 
(vi) scheduling a Fairness Hearing in this matter, and (vii) providing such other and further relief 
as the Court deems reasonable and just. 
 
Dated: October 5, 2012 Respectfully submitted, 
  
NICOLE PIMENTAL and JESSICA FRANKLIN, 
individually and on behalf of all others similarly 
situated,  
 
 By:  /s/  Rafey S. Balabanian    
   One of Plaintiffs’ Attorneys  
 
                                                
3  The Settlement Administrator, Epiq Systems, will also be sending notice to the required 
government officials pursuant to the Class Action Fairness Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1715. (Ex. 1, § 4.2(i)).   
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JAY EDELSON (Admitted Pro Hac Vice) 
(jedelson@edelson.com) 
RAFEY S. BALABANIAN (Admitted Pro Hac Vice) 
(rbalabanian@edelson.com) 
CHRISTOPHER L. DORE (Admitted Pro Hac Vice) 
(cdore@edelson.com)   
EDELSON MCGUIRE LLC 
350 North LaSalle Street, Suite 1300 
Chicago, Illinois 60654 
Phone: 312.589.6370 
 
SEAN P. REIS (SBN 184004) 
(sreis@edelson.com) 
EDELSON MCGUIRE LLP 
30021 Tomas Street, Suite 300 
Rancho Santa Margarita, California 92688 
Phone: 949.459.2124 
 
SCOTT D. OWENS (Admitted Pro Hac Vice) 
(scott@scottowens.com] 
LAW OFFICES OF SCOTT D. OWENS, ESQ. 
2000 East Oakland Park Boulevard, Suite 106 
Ft. Lauderdale, Florida 33306 
Phone: 954.306.8104 
 
JORDAN L. LURIE (SBN 130013) 
(jlurie@weisslurie.com) 
JOEL E. ELKINS (SBN 256020) 
(jelkins@weisslurie.com) 
WEISS & LURIE 
10940 Wilshire Boulevard, 23rd Floor 
Los Angeles, California 90024 
Phone: 310.208.2800 
 
STEFAN COLEMAN 
LAW OFFICES OF STEFAN COLEMAN, PLLC  
1072 Madison Ave, Suite 1  
Lakewood, NJ  08701 
Phone: 877.333.9427 
 
Additional Counsel for Plaintiffs  
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
  
 I, Christopher L. Dore, an attorney, certify that, on October 5, 2012, I caused the above and 
foregoing Plaintiffs’ Notice of Motion and Motion in Support of Preliminary Approval of Class 
Action Settlement to be filed and served on all counsel of record via the Court’s CM/ECF 
electronic filing system, on this the 5th of October 2012. 
 
   
       /s/  Christopher L. Dore     
          
         
Case4:11-cv-02585-YGR   Document84   Filed10/05/12   Page27 of 27
